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  • 學術信息

    學術報告:Sourcing Competition Under Cost Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry

    發布日期:2020-06-28 16:37 點擊次數:

    學術報告:Sourcing Competition Under Cost Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry


    分享人:吳肖樂 復旦大學管理學院管理科學系教授、博士生導師

    主持人:謝磊   山東大學管理學院管理科學與工程系 副研究員


    時間:2020年07月01日(星期三)10:00-11:30

    騰訊會議:會議號 431 706 001

    會議鏈接 https://meeting.tencent.com/s/ZbpJO7cMAGm2


    學術報告摘要:Driven by increasing costs in the traditionally-regarded low-cost manufacturing bases (e.g., China), many firms have started to outsource their production to the regions of even lower costs (e.g., Southeast Asia). However, a new environment may involve higher cost uncertainty and severer information asymmetry. Motivated by these observations, we consider a sourcing game where competing firms choose between a supplier with transparent certain cost (type-C supplier) and a supplier with potentially lower but less transparent, uncertain cost (type-U supplier). We characterize the equilibrium of the sourcing game and study how different parameters affect the firms' sourcing strategy and profit performance. First, we find that due to information asymmetry, a large market size can make firms prefer the C-supplier to the U-supplier even if the latter has a lower average cost. Second, reducing the cost uncertainty or improving the signal accuracy of the U-supplier does not necessarily make it more attractive to sourcing firms, which cautions the suppliers when making efforts to mitigate cost uncertainty or improve cost estimation. Third, higher competition intensity makes the diversified sourcing strategy more likely to be adopted under certain conditions. Interestingly, increasing the cost of the C-supplier (e.g., a cost hike in China) may make both sourcing firms better off because it can lead to a new sourcing equilibrium. Finally, this paper shows that the direction of quantity distortion under the optimal competitive mechanism differs from that under the traditional monopolistic setting.


    分享人簡介:吳肖樂,復旦大學管理學院教授、博士生導師。2006于清華大學工業工程系取得學士學位,2011年博士畢業于圣路易斯華盛頓大學。主要研究供應鏈管理、風險管理、可持續性運營問題。其研究工作發表于Management Science, MSOM, POM等。主持包括國家自然科學基金優秀青年項目、面上項目等。入選上海市曙光人才計劃、上海市教育系統巾幗建功標兵。曾獲中國管理學青年獎、華人學者管理科學與工程協會最佳論文一等獎、上海市第十三屆哲學社會科學優秀成果二等獎、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。目前擔任期刊POM的Senior Editor, Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。


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